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ceptions that conjoin human and nonhuman reality. As Horton (1973a) and Skorupski (1976) have said, Durkheim also includes this view: "the realities to which religious speculation is then applied are the same [as for philosophy and science]: they are nature, man, society" (1976 [1912] : 429). Freud (1964 Freud ( [1927 ) also finds the source of religious belief in human experience with humans, namely, in the child-parent relationship.' Religion is the child's later unconscious projection of this relationship to the world generally. The "first step" into religion, Freud says (p. 22), is the "humanization of nature." He and Durkheim, as Spiro (1966:102) notes, "agreeing that the cognitive roots of religious belief are to be found in social experience, disagree only about the structural context of the experience." Freud also supposed, probably mistakenly (cf. Harman 1974 on the logic of unconscious thought), that these unconscious processes and early experiences typically are illogical and are the characteristic or even sole source of religious conceptions. Nonetheless, if the irrationalism of his description is tempered, it complements Tylor's somewhat one-sided rationalism and Durkheim's social functionalism. In any case, it is notable that these three, agreeing on little else about religion, apparently could agree that some "humanization of nature" is fundamental to it.
For Malinowski, religion is entirely different from science and other secular thought. It is motivated not by cognitive or practical needs but by "cultural" and emotional ones. It is (as for Freud) a fantasy, "more akin to daydreaming and wish-fulfillment" (Malinowski 1979 (Malinowski [1931 : 43) than to science. It is really an attempt not to explain experience, but to contradict it, motivated by "highly derived" cultural and individual "needs" (p. 45) to ritualize and regulate social relations and to deny the reality of death. The funeral is the most important rite, an afterlife the most important belief. Empiricism and logic are not merely irrelevant, but inimical, to religion.
In my opinion, Malinowski is right to say that religion and magic allow humans to act despite uncertainty, by providing schemes for interpretation and influence, but he is mistaken to think that this distinguishes them from science or from common sense. All equally are attempts to make experience coherent by formulating some adequate representation of it. Furthermore, his emotionalist and cultural conservationist theses are largely refuted by one religion or another. Shinto, Judaism, and most of the Japanese "new religions" (Norbeck 1970, Arai 1972), among others, hold death an evil but show little concern for an afterlife, seeking instead to improve and extend life in this world. Others, such as those of the Apache (Opler 1936) and other foragers and of the Homeric Greeks, depict an afterlife so bleak or vague as to offer cold comfort. They do not seem especially motivated by a desire to deny death, although they in part concern it. Many religions are not, as Malinowski alleged, indifferent to practical concerns, but are means to promote them. The fact that many religions have highly developed logical traditions weakens his claim that reason is irrelevant to religious thought. Finally, millennial and proselytizing religions undermine his claim that religion essentially is culturally conservative.
Among recent definitions of religion, Geertz's (1966:4) probably is best-known: "a system of symbols which acts to produce powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic." Geertz thus defines religion functionally, by its purpose: to construct, and to make people believe in, an ultimately reasonable universe. Such orientation is necessary because humans, unlike bees or beavers, are without genetically specified 7 The most thorough critique of Horton and of intellectualism is Skorupski (1976) . I give no critique of Horton here but should note one result of changing, as I propose below, the phrase "social relationships" in his (1960) definition of religion to the more general "models." This result is to resolve his question whether one is obliged by his definition to include relationships with animals as "religion." By my definition, if the extension is systematic, the answer seems to be yes. This answer may raise the objection, based on the existence in the West and elsewhere of quasi-social relationships with pets, that the definition would include these relationships and thus depart from common sense and from such (allegedly) typical religious features as one-sided dependency and feelings of reverence.
Several replies may be made to such an objection. First, it does not seem strongly sustained by contemporary Western relations with animals, domestic or wild, since these relations are usually only very weakly human-like, very weakly featuring ethics, contract, and (apart from recent work with chimpanzees and gorillas, which perhaps is a limiting case) postulated symbolic communication. When individuals speak in private to their pets, they may perhaps be termed "idiosyncratic" rather than systematic. Where they do so in public, as in many foraging and pastoral cultures, they may well be called "religious." Second, the apparent contradiction of the existence of such nonreligious, though apparently human-like, relations with tradition of Tylor and Frazer, thinks that religion, like other systems of thought and action, is principally an attempt at explanation and control. Its topic and object is the world at large, not society alone. This tradition is sometimes called rationalism, intellectualism, or neo-Tylorianism, and Horton (although Jarvie and Agassi, among others, have promoted it) has given it its "most thoroughgoing and explicit current exposition" (Skorupski 1976:178) . His definition of religion as an "extension of the field of people's social relationships beyond the confines of purely human society" (1960:211) and the theory it represents can be developed farther and perhaps refined.
The behavioral terms in which Horton casts his definition raise the question why people should so extend their social relationships. The simplest answer, as he suggests, is that they think that (etically) nonhuman, yet human-like, entities exist, entities with whom such relationships can and should be maintained. That is, people apply human-like models to the nonhuman world and act accordingly. This situation leads to my definition, "the systematic application of human-like models to nonhuman in addition to human phenomena." This definition is meant to indicate the indirect, model-using nature of all knowledge of the world and to lead to an epistemology in which religious models are similar in construction and use to other models. It broadens the question What is a human social relation? to the question What does "human-like" mean? By stating that religion is a kind of model-use, it directly raises the question Why should human-like models be applied to the nonhuman world? and leads to the answer (Horton 1967 ): Because they appear the most orderly, economic, and plausible interpretations available for some nonhuman things and events.
Unlike Horton (1967) , I see no sharp difference between "commonsense" explanations and "theoretical" scientific and religious ones. Common sense is theory, made axiomatic by usage and tacit consensus (Nietzsche 1966). All knowledge of the world is contingent and mediate, and all propositions about the world are theoretical. Evidently also unlike Horton, I think that human-like models are chosen not so much because they are the most "orderly" as because they are (for several reasons) the most "important" and because they can generate the widest variety of phenomena (I admit that importance, generality, and order usually are somehow proportionate, but they are not synonymous). In any case, I hope to support and extend Horton's rationalism by urging that anthropomorphism is inevitable in human thought; that it is, though by definition mistaken, not especially irrational; and that it characterizes "religious" thought in particular.
The observation that religion includes anthropomorphism has been made often before. Xenophanes (ca. 500 B.C.) said that Thracian gods had blue eyes and red hair while Ethiopian gods had black skin and snub noses, and that if lions and horses had gods they would resemble lions and horses. Aristotle said that "all people say that the gods also had a king because they themselves had kings . .. for men create the gods after their own image" (Evans-Pritchard 1965:49). Aquinas said that Christian conceptions of God are anthropomorphic, although reasonable and true. Hume (1957 [1757] :29) noted that "there is a universal tendency among mankind to conceive all beings like themselves and to transfer to every object those qualities with which they are familiarly acquainted, and of which they are intimately conscious." Feuerbach (1957 Feuerbach ( [1873 ) said that deities are projections of the human mind's self-awareness and in particular that the Christian God is a projection of the mind's perception of its own infinity. Tylor, Durkheim, and Freud, as noted, found it significant that religions in some way project humanity upon nature. Whitney (1881) wrote that religion is essentially anthropomorphism and mistaken although reasonable. Phelps (1881) and Craufurd (1909) , like Aquinas, found religion "anthropomorphistic" but nonetheless reasonable and true. Levi-Strauss (1966:221) has said that "religion consists in a humanization of natural laws" and has referred to the "anthropomorphization of nature (of which religion consists)." Jarvie and Agassi (1967:58; say that revelation and anthropomorphism distinguish religion from magic (although in the latter work [p. 2391 magic too is "anthropomorphic") and science. Barbour (1971 :217) , among others, has noted that the biblical "model for God is a human person." Evans-Pritchard, although he says that the "anthropomorphic features of the Nuer conception of God are very weak," nevertheless notes that "man's relationship to him is, as it is among other peoples, on the model of a human social relationship" (1970:7). He notes also that the Nuer God "walks" with men, has a genealogical relationship to them, and is prayed to in human language. Some gods are less like humans than others, but all, in contrast to philosophical or scientific concepts, retain some human character.
All "religions," by any useful definition, include gods. Even Buddhism, perennially cited (e.g., by Durkheim 1976 Durkheim [1912 , Bambrough 1977 , Winch 1977 as an "atheistic religion," is in fact, as religion, fully theistic. The misapprehension that Buddhism is an atheistic religion rests on a Western confusion of religion with philosophy that (as Leach [1968:1] notes) probably stems from influential early studies on philosophical writings rather than on popular belief and practice. Spiro (1966: 93) puts it briskly: "There are, to be sure, atheistic Buddhist philosophies-just as there are atheistic Hindu philosophiesbut it is certainly a strange spectacle when anthropologists, of all people, confuse the teachings of a philosophical school with the beliefs and behavior of a religious community." EvansPritchard also says that claims that Buddhism and Jainism are atheistic religions are "serious distortions" (1965:119), for the same reason. In my own experience, popular rural Soto Zen Buddhism certainly appears theistic: people pray to ancestors for various moral and material benefits. The popular Western conundrum of Buddhism as a "godless religion" appears largely our own product.
Not only sceptics, but also theologians, philosophers of religion, and comparative religionists widely recognize the anthropomorphism of religion. They often see it as a difficulty for theology. Tillich complains that "ordinary theism has made God a heavenly, completely perfect person who resides above the world" (1951:245). Palmer says that in theology "anthropomorphism is anathema" (1973:36) but nevertheless ubiquitous; he alludes to a resulting "difficulty all theologians have in meaning what they say" (p. xv). Newman (1870:3-4) approves of attributing to God "a mind that understands us and a soul that loves us [as] the core of religion," yet denounces attributing a face or hands to Him as an "ancient puerility" and a "pernicious superstition." Brandon (1970 Barbour and Meynell, among others, hope to resolve this paradox while preserving religious belief, but they seem quixotic. Freud (1964 Freud ( [1927 :51-52) finds philosophers of religion guilty of "dishonesty" and intellectual misdemeanour. Philosophers stretch the meaning of words until they retain scarcely anything of their original sense. They give the name of "God" to some vague abstraction which they have created for themselves [and] boast that they have recognized a higher, purer concept of God, notwithstanding that their God is now nothing more than an insubstantial shadow and no longer the mighty personality of religious doctrine. Critics persist in describing as "deeply religious" anyone who admits to a sense of man's insignificance in the face of the universe, although . .. the religious attitude is not this feeling but only the next step after it, the reaction to it. I am in good company, then, in noting that religion typically (always, in my opinion) is anthropomorphistic. Nonetheless, only a very few writers have thought that this fact provides either a definition or an explanation of religious belief, and many seem to think anthropomorphism incidental to religion, even if omnipresent. My assertion, in contrast, is that humanlike but not human beings both are universal in and characterize religious belief and that they not only are made plausible by experience, but are made (at least contingently) persuasive by it.
RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR THOUGHT: SAME OR DIFFERENT?
Because they see real differences in content and apparent differences in form between religious and secular thought, many anthropologists and others (e.g., Leach 1954; Freud 1964 Freud [1927 Barre 1970 Barre , 1978 Dunn 1972; Pruyser 1976 ) have thought religious models peculiarly nonrational and have sought irrational, expressive, or "symbolic" (in some especially strong sense) motivations and reasons for them. Barbour (a physicist and historian of science who does not so contrast them) says that "most writers today see science and religion as strongly contrasting enterprises which have essentially nothing to do with each other" (1971: 1). Pruyser, a psychologist, alludes to a "profound but sublime irrationality of all religious propositions" and says that "religious thought is unlike common sense, scientific thought, or wit" (1976:18, 47). Philosophers Brown and Winch agree that, unlike secular practices, "religious practices are not, at bottom, informed by beliefs" (Brown 1977:254) . Parsons says that "ritual" actions are "not to be measured by the standards of intrinsic rationality at all" (1968:431). Jarvie and Agassi say that "it is no longer controversial to regard religion as irrational," that "few people these days bother to claim that religion is rational in [any sense]," and that "religion defies most criteria of rational belief" (1967:57, 71). And Malcolm says that in Western academic philosophy, religious belief is "commonly regarded as unreasonable and is viewed with condescension or even contempt" (1977: 148). It appears to me, however, that these distinctions of religious from nonreligious belief have been overdrawn, and I stress some continuities between them instead.
One reason for the view that religion constitutes a separate mode of thought is that most 20th-century theorists either have found religious belief untenable or at least have seen that it is largely irreconcilable with science and have tried to account for the differences between religious and secular assertions by globally contrasting religion to science. They depict these two as at poles and deny that the goal of science-to understand and portray the real world-is the goal of religion. Agassi 1967, 1973) , none of these assertions clearly distinguishes religion from secular thought or even from science. First, the notion of "supernatural" upon which so many influential definitions8 of religion rest is itself, like the term it is meant to distinguish, a Western folk category, not a cross-cultural one. It often is not found in non-Western religions (Hallowell 1960 , Saler 1977 ). Saler notes that definitions using it are circular, since they rest on " 'beliefs' in 'supernatural' beings . .. without saying much about what they understand by either 'beliefs' or 'supernatural'" (1977:51). He calls this doubly regrettable and concludes that we should apply our "natural-supernatural opposition only when we can demonstrate that the natives make use of a similar opposition or when we explicitly desire to point out that they do not.... it is misleading to refer to beings or powers in non-Western world views as 'supernatural' when supernatural is not salient in native thought." In my own fieldwork, for example, the Japanese term for "supernatural" (choshizenteki, possibly a translation of the Western term) seemed unknown to most people, some of whom said that it might mean "extremely natural." While much religious belief does not include the "supernatural," it may on the other hand arguably occur in popular Western views of unidentified flying objects, astrology, quarks, black holes, and luck. Horton (1967) similarly suggests that "supernatural" is no more descriptive of African traditional thought than of Western lay understanding of nuclear explosions. Luckman (1976:678) calls the whole supernaturalempirical opposition a "vestige of 19th-century scientism" that has "misled much anthropological, sociological, and religionswissenschaftliche theorizing about religion." Similarly, the apparent (to anthropologists) falsity of spirits or superhuman beings hardly seems to distinguish them from such theoretical entities as neutrons or phlogiston. Nor is their resistance to disproof unique, since as Kuhn (1970) has shown and Popper (1976) has agreed, the theoretical systems of science also show such resistance (and probably do so necessarily, although some philosophers of science have decried it).
I admit that religion and science (as the alleged type case of secular thought) may be distinguished as ideal systems by their methodologies and-contingently and partially-by their topical emphases and conclusions. Religion, as Horton (1967) puts it, has "mixed motives." It not only explains, but also entertains (e.g., with music and dance), undergirds morals, supports or attacks political systems, and so on. Science, in contrast, at least ideally, is restricted to proposing and criticizing theories.
As Popper (1976:55) says, it is "essentially critical.... it consists of bold conjectures, controlled by criticism." Barnes (1974: viii) thinks that it is the "most elaborated and systematized of all forms of knowledge, and the least anthropomorphic." Religion, on the other hand, in part because, as I shall suggest, it ostensibly is a kind of social relationship, tends not to be selfcritical, although it may be highly systematized. Most notably, it always is anthropomorphic. Nonetheless, it is important that religion and science both are concerned to explain and control experience coherently and economically.9 Moreover, they appear to be on common epistemological ground. The widespread notion that they are not on common ground arises in part from a faulty secular epistemology (naive realism) of common sense and science and in part from a faulty religious epistemology (the doctrine of revelation) of religion. Both epistemologies are associated with the assumption, denied above, that religion necessarily concerns a supernatural world and science and common sense a natural one. Both are refuted by the now apparent facts that religion, science, common sense, and indeed most "simple" sensory perception (Arnheim 1969 (Arnheim , 1974 Piaget 1970) Assessing a model's rationality (its apportionment of means to ends) requires some independent examination both of the information available for it and of the phenomena it is meant to explain (requires knowing, that is, its ends and its means) and also some alternate model with which to compare it. One model may then be better than another, but all must actively be built upon ambiguous sensory data. Kant pointed out that we never know "things in themselves," but know them only as phenomena through the inevitable biases of our minds. Aquinas earlier said much the same of knowledge about God. Durkheim (1976 Durkheim ( [1912 :237), following Kant, said that as our senses show it, reality has the "grave inconvenience" of inscrutability: "For to explain [even to 'perceive,' according to Wittgenstein (1953: 194e) and Arnheim (1974) ] is to attach things to each other and to establish relations between them.... But sensations, which see nothing except from the outside, could never make them disclose these relations and internal bonds; the intellect alone can create the notion of them." Nietzsche (1966:315, translation mine)'0 concludes that the human world is an arduous and uncertain construction: "One may well admire man here as a mighty genius of construction, who succeeds in raising the superstructure of an infinitely complex conceptual cathedral on a moving foundation and, so to speak, on flowing water." Popper uses a similar metaphor of science as a "system of theories on which we work as do masons on a cathedral" (1976: 57). Piaget also finds that conceptions of the world are built up laboriously as increasingly comprehensive (and otherwise different as well, from childhood to adulthood) but still tentative schemes. Like other structures on fluid footings, conceptions of the world are uncertain. Nietzsche (1966:315, translation mine)" says that the "cathedral" built on the flow of perception "must be a structure as of cobweb, so delicate that it is carried along by the waves, so strong that it is not blown apart by every wind." Douglas (1968) ties (e.g., "E= MC2" and "pigs is pigs")-such analogies as sun/planets = nucleus/electrons, children/parents = descendents/ancestors, needle/doll = enemy/spear, and "legs"/ relations between these two." As Skorupski (1976:173) remarks, we need "to be set free from the strait-jacket of 'ritual = sacred = symbolic' versus 'practical = profane = instrumental' and the contortions to which this simple-minded opposition leads." I hope to dissolve these apparent problems by showing that no sharp distinction of religion as a separate mode can, or need, be made in principle or in practice. Instead, religion can be identified (though not sharply contrasted to nonreligion) as systematic use of a particular kind of model for a particular kind of phenomenon, viz., of anthropomorphic models for nonhuman things and events in addition to human ones. It arises, as do all systems of thought, from the need to account for the world and from the reasonable tendency to do this with models that already have proved significant. My argument begins with the fact that anthropomorphic models usually are, for humans, because originally constructed of and for them, the most significant of models. They are with us from cradle to grave, explicitly and implicitly, from introspection, from observation of other people, and from instruction. They necessarily interest everyone (witness pervasive anthropomorphism in, for example, advertising, greeting cards, and other commercial art) and are constantly employed in everyday life. If the wind buffets one's front door, for example, one first thinks that it may be a visitor. A runner in the park wishes to know whether an upright shape glimpsed near his path is that of another human, or merely of a drinking fountain, a shrub, or a pile of trash bags against a tree, or whether a sound behind him is running human footsteps or blowing leaves, and if human whether it is merely an echo of himself. Although a human-like model subsequently may be discarded if another model clearly is better, it usually is tried before others.
Models of humans not only are "significant," but also are multifaceted and highly general. They enable us to hear voices in the wind, see the human form in diverse colors and shapes, and perceive a plan in the change of seasons. Because of their significance and generality, we employ them more frequently than the realities-real humans-from which they derive actually occur. Goethe says that "the human never grasps how anthropomorphistic he is" (cited in Liebert 1909:22, translation mine).'3 Not all resulting perceptions are "religious," but all display the cognitive principles (though not the historical or political ones) underlying religions. These principles include the organization of all perception according to models; the choice of models from a limited set by criteria of adequacy, probability, and significance; and the resulting frequent choice of humanlike models for ambiguous phenomena. Although these principles lead to religion, they are not unique to it, but are found in nonreligious thought as well.
A COGNITIVE APPROACH
My argument may be put in five propositions and two informal deductions,14 as follows:
PI. Phenomena (aspects of the world as known through our senses) initially are ambiguous. D 1. Therefore phenomena (at least salient or potentially significant ones) must be interpreted.
P2. Phenomena are interpreted by a set of models based on experience of analogous phenomena. P3. A model by which to interpret a phenomenon in a context is chosen from the set by (a) its capacity to generate the phenomenon, (b) the likelihood of occurrence of the phenomenon from which the model derives, and (c) its subjective importance to the observer. P4. Humans, (a) because they are complex and multifaceted, generate a very wide range of phenomena; (b) as social beings, are likely to be wherever the human perceiver may be; and (c) are the most important factor in the human environment.
D2. Therefore human-like models frequently are chosen to interpret ambiguous phenomena.
P5. Generalization and systematization of this choice is the cognitive basis of religion.
I shall explicate and illustrate these assertions. Phenomena (aspects of the world as known through our senses) initially are ambiguous (PI). In and of themselves, "phenomena" have neither identity nor meaning. When we first hear Katze it does not evoke a cat, nor does our first sight or smell of smoke mean fire; nor does either experience have definable form. Because of what Geertz (1966:13) calls the "extreme generality of man's innate . . . response capacities," the meanings of phenomena for us (unlike the apparent case for insects, for example) are not built into them, but conferred on them. Perception even of simple shapes is an "eminently active occu-pation" (Arnheim 1974: 43) . Moreover, even after a given phenomenon has meaning, it must on every subsequent encounter still be identified as the "same" phenomenon. What appears to be a snake on the path may also be a rope or twig, and what seems a voice in the house may be a gurgle in the plumbing. Although we are made aware of ambiguity only occasionally, as when some salient datum such as snake/rope or voice/gurgle resists interpretation, all sense data are in principle ambiguous-or, more accurately, meaningless-until acted upon. Positive action is required to understand what impinges on us, to "grasp" reality, because as our senses show it it has the "grave inconvenience" of inscrutability.
Therefore phenomena (at least salient or potentially significant ones) must be interpreted (DI). We cannot allow phenomena to remain ambiguous, for practical reasons among others: we ask, e.g., "Is this paint wet or dry?" Our need is not only practical, however, but (and more immediately) "intellectual." As Geertz (1966:15) says, humans typically are unable to "leave unclarified problems of analysis merely unclarified," but the place of analysis is more fundamental than Geertz here implies. As Wittgenstein (1967), Hanson (1958 Hanson ( , 1969 , Arnheim (1974) , Popper (1976), Lakatos (1976), and others have said, no perception is unprejudiced. All perception is theory-laden. To perceive is to construe. We do not simply "see" things, but always see them "as" something. Popper (1976:52) notes that "we approach everything in the light of a preconceived theory" and Geertz (1973:215) that "every conscious perception is an act of recognition."
Phenomena are interpreted by means of a set of models based on experience of analogous phenomena (P2). Ambiguity is resolved by selecting a model that somehow corresponds to the phenomenon in question. The set of available models is based somehow (evidently by "intuition" as well as by tuition) on experience and reason (cultural or individual), and choice from this set is based on some judgments of adequacy. As Pettit (1977:23) remarks of interpreting speech, this choice is a "self-corrective one in which a structure is assigned, the interpretation it gives examined and the structure accepted only where the interpretation seems reasonable." A model . .. is chosen from the set by (a) its capacity to generate the phenomenon (P3). Some features of the model must "correspond" to some features of the phenomenon; i.e., model and phenomenon must constitute a more or less close "analogy." But analogy alone is not enough, since more than one model may provide it: a small serpentine object in one's path may match, more or less, one's model of a snake, a rope, a twig, or something else. So one also must judge (b) the likelihood of occurrence of the phenomenon from which the model derives. This judgment is very largely contextual: if the path is a city sidewalk, one will more likely think the object a rope than a snake; if it is a forest trail, one will more likely think it a snake. Empson (1930:304, cited by Pettit 1977:23-24), says similarly of interpreting a poem that in accepting a syntax there is a preliminary stage of uncertainty; the grammar may be of such and such a kind; the words are able to be connected in this way or that.... a plausible grammar is picked up at the same time as the words it orders, but with a probability attached to it, and the less probable alternatives, ready, if necessary, to take its place, are in some way present in the back of your mind.
The third criterion is (c) its subjective importance to the observer. By "subjective," I mean not "unreliable," but "emic," and I assume it to be generally reasonable and adaptive. A model may be "important" for many reasons, but its level of organization surely is a crucial one. This reason is both intellectual and pragmatic. Intellectually, the more phenomena we can bring under a single organization, the more experience we "understand." Pragmatically, more highly organized things normally have a greater impact upon us than do less organized ones. Snakes are more highly organized than twigs and so in many contexts take priority over them as interpretations of serpentine phenomena.
Nonetheless, if one is preoccupied with finding twigs, he may mistake a snake for a twig, because "our perception is organized in the light of particular interests" (Barbour 1974 :120) and because of "preconceived theory" (Popper 1976:52). Preoccupation prejudices perception. But prejudice is justified. The art historian Gombrich has said that "the greater the biological relevance an object has to us, the more will we be attuned to its recognition-and the more tolerant will therefore be our standards of formal correspondence" (cited in Arnheim 1974: 51). Gombrich's point may be generalized by omitting "biological" (although "tolerant" must be modified by "temporarily")."15 Nothing, on the whole, is more relevant to humans than humans. As we are necessarily preoccupied with each other, we are attuned to recognize each other, and our "standards of formal correspondence" accordingly are tolerant, at least for initial recognition. Ambiguous phenomena commonly are measured first against a human-like template. What fits is especially noted, and what does not may be held in suspension. An Xshaped reflection (as from garments of road crews or of runners) in our headlights is examined for analogy to the dimensions of the human chest and back and vertical stripes for analogy to arms and legs. Projective tests such as those of Rorschach confirm this priority of human-like models: responses to ambiguity most commonly invoke the human form. Beck Humans, (a) because they are complex and multifaceted, generate a wide variety of phenomena (P4). Humans, especially clothed ones, appear in many shapes and colors. If camouflaged, they may not appear at all, even if "visible." Humans also communicate in many media: in "bird" calls, ciphers, flags, smoke signals, telegraphs, and others. Human capacities for behavior are so variously exploited in culture that it is difficult (particularly when humans deliberately disguise themselves) to distinguish phenomena that in principle could not be human from ones that could be. If it is important to detect humans, it is important to inspect many potential clues; and, as I shall argue, there is no clear, comprehensive division in fact between "human" and "nonhuman" clues. Even symbolism, often thought (e.g., by White 1969) exclusively human, must now to a degree be acknowledged in higher primates. Real continuities and similarities between ourselves and the nonhuman world, in shape, color, organization, volition, and intelligence, make "human" nature perpetually difficult to distinguish from nonhuman nature. Detecting misapplied human-like models, if it is possible, requires perpetual reflection.
Humans (b) as social beings, are likely to be wherever the human observer may be (P4). Since we are raised and usually live in groups, we usually and reasonably expect the presence of other humans. Few if any contexts rule out the possible presence, or at least traces, of other people.
Humans (c) are the most important factor in the human environment (P4). Objectively and subjectively, other people are, to virtually everyone, the most important entities in the world. 15 It should be noted that the same high priority that makes our standards of correspondence tolerant for recognition of humans and human-like things makes them intolerant in the course of further inspection. Once one has decided that something is "human," one wants to know what kind of human, or human to what degree. Depending on the human's apparent relation to oneself (e.g., kinsman or stranger, encountered in a throng or in wilderness, seen at close quarters or at a distance), one's scrutiny may be more or less intense. But scrutiny normally does not cease-although it may become covert -upon the decision that an entity is somehow human. On the contrary, it normally intensifies. This situation raises a crucial question: What exactly do I mean by a "human-like" model? A few characteristics seem most nearly to distinguish humans from nonhumans. These (orthodoxly enough) are-despite some symbolism in chimps and gorillas-language and symbolism generally and resulting capacities for formal and symbolic statements about, and using, social relations among other things. "Religion," then, means applying models to the nonhuman world in whole or in part that credit it with a capacity for language (as do prayer and other linguistic, including some "ritual," action) and for associated symbolic action (as do, e.g., sacrifice for rain and other "rituals"). Douglas (1978:86) points out, in a rather different context, some of the features I call religious in the world views of primitive societies generally: the primitive universe is "expected to behave as if it were intelligent, responsive to signs, symbols, gestures, gifts, and as if it could discern between social relationships." She notes that Frazer is "full of examples of belief in an impersonal universe which, nonetheless, listens to speech and responds to it one way or another. So are modern fieldworkers' reports" (pp. 86-87).
It is the use of language, then, vis-a-vis the nonhuman world that I think most characterizes religion. What leads to linguistic expectations of the nonhuman universe, which, I think, really neither listens nor replies? For the most part, a rationalistic view suffices: they are plausible applications of significant models to ambiguous phenomena. This view applies here, as to other human features in models.
However, because of the important but ill-understood relation of language to cognition generally, I would like to make some suggestions about a possible special relation between it and religion. As our principal means of communication, language is our principal means of comprehending and controlling the world in toto. Our capacity for it and inclination to use it are somehow "built in": not mere opportune exploitation of anatomy and neurology, but a biologically broadly based, deeply integrated system (Lenneberg 1967 , Geschwind 1970 , Chomsky 1972 , Lieberman 1975 . Language may be distinguished from other natural communication by such features as productivity, displacement, and arbitrariness (Hockett 1973 ), but neither its form nor its content may be narrowly specified. Its "arbitrariness" means that the information it conveys depends not on the specific events that carry it, but on production and interpin tation by a learned system. Sending and receiving "messages" by a learned system is a basic human orientation to the world, by genetic predisposition and by experience.
Although language typically is spoken, its media in principle are unlimited. It depends on a code, not a medium. Any and all events therefore may be-and in fact are scrutinized as-potential messages. We do not limit the environment we scrutinize and address to other humans. We find "messages" not only in books, road signs, and semaphores, where a human is not present but was at some time, but everywhere, in outer space (e.g., by radio astronomy; and we shoot messages into space as well) and in the flight or entrails of birds.
In prevailing scientific constructions of the world, signs and signals from and to the nonhuman sector are not linguistic. They do not display arbitrariness, productivity, and displacement, nor do most of them (pace Levi-Strauss 1966:267-69, and excepting some higher primate behavior and some human behavior vis-a-vis outer space) have intention or meaning common to humans and nonhumans. Linguistic features have been dropped, as misleading, from most scientific models of the world as a whole. Scientists, unlike astrologers, diviners, and priests, now do not think that most natural "signs" that we do encounter are ethically or systematically related to humans and their purposes: stars do not chart our health, entrails forecast victory, or earthquakes punish sin. Many people (probably all, at some time and to some degree), however, continue to interpret the world at large in such linguistic and normative ways. Survivors of the 1970 Peru earthquake, for example, spontaneously assumed that it was a punishment (Bode 1974 (etically) are not.17 Psalm 19:1-4 (in Jones 1966:800-801), for example, asserts that The heavens declare the glory of God, the vault of heaven proclaims his handiwork; day discourses of it to day, night to night hands on the knowledge. No utterance at all, no speech, no sound that anyone can hear; yet their voice goes out through all the earth and their message to the ends of the world. If religion may be described as a system of postulated communication at a linguistic level, perhaps magic and divination similarly may be described as postulated communication at the level of nonhuman animal call systems (which lack arbitrariness, displacement, and productivity and which-like magicachieve their ends automatically). Religion and magic, aiming messages at and listening for messages from the nonhuman world, share an overestimation of its organization. Religion, using symbols, assumes a human level of organization, and magic, using signs, assumes a nonhuman (pace Agassi and Jarvie [1973:239] , who call magic "anthropomorphic") animal level of organization in phenomena that (in the etic view) do not possess them. Religion credits the nonhuman world with speaking a language, and magic credits it with sending and receiving calls.
Horton ( says that magic, "that 'gigantic variation on the theme of Causality'. . . can be distinguished from science not so much by any ignorance or contempt of determination but by a more imperious and uncompromising demand for it." Durkheim (1976 Durkheim ( [1912 :28) similarly says that religious conceptions primarily concern "not that which is exceptional and abnormal in things, but, on the contrary, that which is normal and regular." A basic Buddhist doctrine is comprehensive causality, karmathat "there are no effects without causes." An assumption of order, then, is not peculiar to religious, magical, or scientific thought, but may be found in them all. What varies is only the kind of organization thought to obtain. Still, why are religion and, to a degree, magic so ambitious in the level of organization that they purport to see, a level from which science retreats? Why do they so reluctantly give up this ambition, despite evidence that they cannot attain it, and why does it spring up anew in every generation? As Durkheim (1976 Durkheim ( [1912 :70) asks, rejecting Tylor's intellectualism, "How could a vain fantasy have been able to fashion human consciousness so strongly and so durably?"
As for the ambition of religious explanation, I (with Horton 1967) suggest that it is, first, an instance of the human tendency to economize thought and action by generalizing, ordering, and system-building. As Agassi and Jarvie ( A second and rather different explanation of the persistence of religious belief also is suggested by the present approach. My answer is that we have asked the wrong question: we should ask not why "religious" models persist although mistaken, but why human-like models persist. The answer then is clear: they persist because they are often right-real humans do exist, under many guises and everywhere in the human environment -and because they are singularly important. Models of humans are, as noted, important both for an intellectual reason (that they provide explanations for a uniquely wide range of phenomena) and for a pragmatic one (when they truly apply, we benefit by acknowledging it). Intellectually, they make the world coherent. Pragmatically, they make possible quick recognition of its most highly organized and powerful elements.
Although like all models they may be applied mistakenly, they are a good risk: it is usually better to err many times by applying them when they do not obtain than to err once by failing to apply them when they do. The guerrilla has good reason to see his enemy in every bush and hear him in every snapping twig: one real enemy justifies a hundred false alarms. The same principle is sometimes made a religious argument for 17 This description is similar to Spiro's (1966:96) definition of religion as an "institution consisting of culturally postulated interaction with culturally postulated superhuman beings," but it specifies that the interaction at least includes symbolic communication and it changes "superhuman" to "nonhuman."
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CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY religiosity: one may as well assume that God exists, because even if He does not, little is lost by the assumption, while if He does, much is gained.18 Only the hindsight supplied by an alternative, nonreligious view identifies religion specifically as treatment of nonhuman entities and events in a human-like way. Until this view emerges and identifies such entities and events as plagues and earthquakes as nonhuman and un-human-like, religion cannot be clearly distinguished from other social relations. This is why Durkheim and his followers thought it to be only social relations in disguise. It may be the same hindsight that makes Tillich say that "religion feels an assault is made on its innermost essence when it is called religion" (1973:28) and that " 'religion' is a derogatory term" (p. 127).
Apart from language and other symbolism, few traits make a model sharply human-like or un-human-like. Rather, any of many traits (music, laughter, breasts, buttocks) may place a model on a continuum more or less human-like. Although Western models of humans now exclude, for example, invisibility and the power of flight, some models of humans (of shamans, witches, and magicians, for example) include these or equivalents. Frazer (1935 Frazer ( [1890 :92) noted that no line necessarily is drawn between humans and gods: man in primitive societies makes no clear distinction between "a god and a powerful sorcerer. His gods are often merely invisible magicians who behind the veil of nature work the same sort of charms and incantations which the human works in a visible and bodily form among his fellows." Although Frazer here thinks that invisibility distinguishes gods from magicians, and although it has also been emphasized by people like Malinowski, Flew, and Beattie, who think a division between empirical and nonempirical distinguishes science from religion, I agree with Horton in seeing no difference between the (usual) invisibility of gods and that of electromagnetic waves or of "ether."
Moreover, humans and many other animals achieve a kind of invisibility by camouflage, which might equally account for the usual invisibility of gods and spirits. Complete invisibility is simulated in human games with blindfolds or darkness and widely exploited in fiction; it does not intrinsically seem nonhuman. On the other hand, gods are thought not always to be invisible, but to reveal themselves at will. They are revealed also, like atomic particles in a cloud chamber, by their actions. Mere invisibility, then, is no reliable measure of the supernatural, of the nonempirical, or of godhead.
The continuity between god and man that Frazer asserts for primitive cultures generally is clearly postulated by the indigenous Japanese religion, Shinto, in which all things are "deities" (kami). The 18th-century Shinto scholar Motoori said that "in principle human beings, birds, animals, trees, plants, mountains, oceans-all may be kami" (Matsumoto 1972:37). A modern scholar similarly says that "all beings have such spirits, so ... all beings can be called kami" (Ono 1969:6). To repeat: because phenomena grade into each other and because our models of them vary and are recombined endlessly, our conceptions of humans are not always distinct from conceptions of the "divine"-or, in my terms, the "nonhuman"-world.
Conceptions that are anthropomorphic in some degree appear everywhere, a fact I now wish to emphasize. I wish to assert that anthropomorphism is and, for reasons cited in the propositions and deductions so far, must be a cultural universal. Not only such apparently spontaneous, individual interpretations, but also cultural ones, are anthropomorphic, at many levels of complexity and self-consciousness. Examples in Western language and literature are familiar and endless. In ordinary language, storms "rage," pines "whisper," brooks "babble," mountains are "majestic," ripe fruit and fresh paint "blush," and so on. More complexly (and probably in conscious metaphor; but all models are metaphoric, whether consciously or not), Helen Keller as a child wrote to a friend that "at first I was very sorry when I found that the sun had hidden his shining face behind dull clouds, but afterwards I thought why he did it, and then I was happy. The sun knows that you like to see the world covered with beautiful white snow" (1903:194) . A recent news story shows two somewhat different anthropomorphizations of rain, the first perhaps self-conscious and the second probably not: "DRUOGNO, Italy, Aug. 8-The news that the Pope was dead came on Sunday night to this Alpine village, and the rain began with a biblical vengeance only a few minutes later.... The old people made the connection at once. The problem, explained an elderly woman dressed in traditional black, was that the angels were weeping for the Pope" (Apple 1978: A13).
Nor is anthropomorphism limited to views of nature in the strict sense. "Culture" itself may in a sense be anthropomorphized: a recent Citibank newsletter (March 1978, p. 3) says of the faltering economy that "many would attribute the slide to the frailties of advancing age, citing the fact that the recovery celebrates its third birthday this month." Here a national economy, more culture than nature, is compared to an aging human.
If the reader objects that such statements are "merely" poetic or metaphoric, I would point out that most of our comprehension of the world is metaphoric. As Nietzsche (1966:314, translation mine)19 put it, "truth" (Wa1trheit) is a "mobile army 18 The same principle seems again to apply, if I may speculate, in at least some nonhuman animals. It may be that they share the tendency to increase the coherence of thought by applying a model of the highest available level of organization. An apartment cat I know often stalks flies as though they were vertebrates, capable of perceiving him at a distance and of remembering him. He usually does not do the reverse: he does not apply a less demanding tactic to the other animal he stalks, another cat. Reindeer avoid piles of rocks built by Eskimos to resemble Eskimos (in order to frighten reindeer), avoidance which seems to reflect a model that, though both mistaken and nonadaptive here, usually may be applied safely to Eskimo-like shapes. If the shape really is an Eskimo, much is gained by avoiding it, while if it is not, relatively little is lost. The situation for theists, cats, and reindeer is perhaps an aspect of game theory: that the first bets to cover are those with the highest possible payoffs.
19 "ein bewegliches Heer von Metaphern, Metonymien, Anthropomorphismen, kurz eine Summe von menschlichen Relationen, die, poetisch und rhetorisch gesteigert, iibertragen, geschmuckt wurden of metaphors, metonyms, anthropomorphisms, in short a collection of human relations that have been poetically and rhetorically elevated, transformed, and decorated, and that after long usage appear to a people firm, canonical, and binding." Non-Western anthropomorphism is as pervasive and diverse as that of the West. Japanese folk tradition, for example, personifies mountains, trees, animals (especially foxes and badgers), and other natural phenomena. Contemporary Japanese (as well as Western) art personifies shoe liners, vegetables, automobiles, and endless others. Automobiles as well as other things may be religiously anthropomorphic, as when a village acquaintance told me of ancestors' preventing a car from starting: "the ancestors said, 'It would be dangerous to go today, so you mustn't go!' You can't hear the ancestors speak in words, so they gave the message by keeping the car from going. If the car had gone, my [spouse] might have had the accident." Iban describe rice "in terms of human moods and attitudes: it is 'unhappy,' 'feels unwanted'-Iban women 'take pity' on small grains while harvesting, it 'cat-ches cold,' 'needs company,' and 'likes attention' " (Jensen 1974:153) .
Linguistic and paralinguistic interpretations of, and behavior toward, nature are especially telling examples. "Prayer" is typical, but such interpretations are highly diverse. They range from complex and sophisticated to simple and evidently spontaneous ones. The Japanese monk Dogen says that "our Buddha's voice and form [is] in all the sounds of the rapid river" (Nakamura 1964:352). Stanner notes that Australian Aborigines move "not in a landscape but in a humanized realm saturated with significations" (Douglas 1978:87). In "As You Like It," the exile says of his forest life that "this our life, exempt from public haunt, finds tongues in trees, books in the running brooks, sermons in stones, and good in everything." The Irish writer Lawless (1898:21) says that "the Connaught or Kerry peasant still hears the shriek of his early gods in the sob of the waves or the howling of the autumn storms." And many modern Westerners talk to, and even suppose they are talked to by, their pets, automobiles, fruit trees, or house plants.
These few examples show that human-like models frequently are chosen to interpret ambiguous phenomena (D2) and that these models are diverse. They show also that while some anthropomorphism is religious, some is not. What is the difference?
According to my final proposition, the major difference is in degree of generalization and systematization (P5). This difference is accompanied by a complex of interwoven conceptions, including true observations about nature, man, and society, and by the greater credibility of more generalized, coherent systems of thought. "Religious" anthropomorphism is relatively systematic, generalized, and integrated, while "nonreligious" anthropomorphism is, like Levi-Strauss's bricoleur, opportunistic, ad hoc, and idiosyncratic. When it is narrow and ad hoc, as when a commercial artist gives a candy bar a face, it may be unconvincing and not "true" in any extended sense. Even limited analogies may be useful, as when a human arm is compared to a mechanical lever or when a cave is said to have a mouth. When it is careful, elaborate, and well thought out, however, anthropomorphism achieves what Geertz calls the "aura of factuality" and the "uniquely realistic" mood (1966:4) of religion. Anthropomorphism, then, interprets not merely immediate experience, but things and events distant in time and space, that may set "ultimate conditions" of human life.
If religions are instances of generalized and systematized anthropomorphism, what can be said of the truth or falsity of their assertions? If false, why do they persist? These questions may seem overweening, but-contrary to some opinion-they do not seem to me to be unanswerable by social science. Nor are they irrelevant to it. Quite the contrary: they bear directly on our understanding of human thought and action and of the human place in nature. My answers here must and can be brief. The characteristic religious assertion is, I think, false: the nonhuman world is, in fact, not a person or persons and does not interact linguistically or ethically with people. Other religious assertions (e.g., that human relations must be ethical or that some systematic relations exist between humans and nonhumans) doubtless are often true. It is not necessary, however, to show that a human-like model well applies in a given case to show why it persists. It persists because it is an applicationincreasingly singled out by sceptics as peculiar-of models to the world generally that have been successful in dealing with the most important components of it. The extension of models, in turn, is an aspect of a general epistemological principle, that knowledge of the world is largely analogical.
Religious explanations continue analogy. Even spontaneous and unsystematic anthropomorphic analogies-voices in the wind and faces in clouds-are sufficiently plausible and compelling to recur endlessly. Their religious extension in ordered and abstracted forms economizes thought and action by system building. It exemplifies "our craving for generality" (Wittgenstein), our "regard [of] the more general principle as the more ... satisfactory" (Campbell), and our "trying to increase the coherence of our total view" (Harman).
In sum, religion arises and persists because the models it uses often are right-although not as it characteristically uses them. Moreover, they are right about phenomena (aspects of ourselves and other real humans) that are uniquely important. The apt question has been not why religious models persist, but why human-like ones do. This question has been easier to answer.
In its aim-to articulate models of and for the world-and in its criteria for those models, religion is not unique among modes of thought and action, but at one with them. Contrary to Geertz's (1966:25) "frank recognition that religious belief involves not a Baconian induction from everyday experiencefor then we should all be agnostics," we should see that it depends precisely on (though, like other beliefs, it is not restricted to) everyday experience. As Durkheim (1976 Durkheim ( [1912 
VIRTUES OF THE APPROACH
Barbour, drawing fromi Toulmin, Carnap, Popper, and Polanyi, lists three criteria of an adequate theory: "its agreement with observations, the internal relations among its concepts, and its comprehensiveness" (1971:144-45). That is, it has applicability to empirical data; coherence, consistency, and simplicity; and generality or "ability to show underlying unity in apparently diverse phenomena" (p. 146). The theory offered appears to satisfy these criteria.
First, it agrees with observations, theistic and atheistic, from Xenophanes to Brandon. Spiro (1966:102) remarks that most theorists in this century "seem to agree that religious statements are believed to be true because religious actors have had social experiences which, corresponding to these beliefs, provide them with face validity." Although few of these theorists seem to think anthropomorphism the basis of religious belief and behavior, few, even in theology, deny its virtual universality there.
Besides agreeing with many past observations, this approach lends itself to further observation, because the definition it uses is substantive and because its principal terms ("human-like," und die nach langem Gebrauch einem Volke fest, kanonisch und verbindlich dUinken."
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Guthrie: A COGNITIVE THEORY OF RELIGION "model," and "phenomena") are themselves relatively easily defined. Like other substantive definitions, it claims to point to a recognizable phenomenon, religion, but it does not depend on showing that religion serves such a specific purpose as producing certain moods and motivations or articulating "ultimate" values. It avoids the difficulty of trying to observe something defined with superlatives such as "ultimate concern" (Lessa and Vogt 1972: 1), "ultimate conditions ... of existence" (Bellah 1970:21), or "uniquely realistic" (Geertz 1966 :4) .
Second, it has coherence and simplicity. It depends on a few general principles of cognition, and it claims no universal functions for religion other than comprehension and control, shared by all models. Since it does not claim such special functions as providing emotional expression or social solidarity (I also do not claim that these and other aims may not be served), it is not subject to controversy over such claims. Neither is it subject to controversy over the general rationality of religion, for if, as I have proposed, religion is simply a kind of model-use, it may, like other model-use, be rational in one instance and not in another.
Third, it is general, in two ways. It claims to unite religion, itself broad and diverse, with anthropomorphism, which is even broader, more diverse, and more pervasive; and it asserts and depends on unity in the principles of religious and secular thought.
One result of this generality is an answer to the question whether nonhuman animals have anything analogous to religion. The orthodox and commonsense answer is that they do not. This answer, when given by anthropologists (e.g., La Barre 1978:57; Kluckhohn 1979:v) and by humanists generally, is usually based on the observation that religion, whatever else it may be, is largely a "symbolic" activity and on the observation that symbolism is virtually absent among nonhuman animals. However, two contemporary anthropologists (Wallace 1966 and van Lawick Goodall 1975) have suggested, on nonsymbolic but quite different grounds, that animals may have something comparable to religion. Wallace supposes that the essence of religion is to accustom people to close cooperation by providing practice in a noninstrumental, "ritual" activity. It produces social unity by rehearsing "stereotyped communication" (1966:233-42) that really communicates nothing but the intent to cooperate. Wallace suggests that the nonhuman animal analogue is such "ritual" as the courtship patterns of birds, which similarly prepares them for cooperation. This functionalist analogy seems to me very limited, since it ignores intention and understanding and cannot distinguish a prayer from a handshake.
Van Lawick Goodall has a different, emotionalist suggestion. She mentions the threat displays with which chimpanzees face rainstorms and waterfalls and, although she cautions that "it makes no sense to talk about 'religion' in relation to the chimpanzee," says that the "awe and wonder, that underlie most religions" may have originated in "such primeval, uncomprehending surges of emotion" vis-a-vis nature as those of chimpanzees (1975:163-64).
My own suggestion, though well illustrated by van Lawick Goodall's chimps, is again different. It is that if "religion" is defined as the systematic application of human-like models to nonhuman in addition to human phenomena, then the animal analogue is the application of animal-like models to inanimate phenomena. If human religion is a kind of anthropomorphism, the animal analogue is a kind of zoomorphism. This, it seems to me, is what chimps exhibit when they threaten storms and waterfalls: they suppose that these, like chimpanzees, baboons, or leopards, are capable of being frightened. Like van Lawick Goodall, I hesitate to call chimpanzees "religious"; but since they seem similarly to attribute to phenomena a higher level of organization than these really possess, I suggest that their situation is closely analogous to that of religious people. Unlike her, I think that any emotions that may be felt by chimpanzees are secondary in a proper analysis of the situation, since emotions themselves may be, like behavior, more results than causes of the models and events that inform them. What is important is the nature of the models that the animals employ and the relation of those models to reality.
Last, I wish briefly to note that the approach also provides possible accounts of ideas like "sacred," "faith," and "supernatural," all often held (especially by Western writers) to distinguish religion from nonreligion in general and from science in particular. These accounts can be given only a few words here but suggest both that these ideas in fact are not unique to religion and why they are sometimes prominent in it. My opinion (with Durkheim and Horton, among others) is that these three ideas all characterize relationships of humans with humans. Where they occur in attitudes toward nature, it is because nature has been interpreted as human-like.
" The same argument applies to the notion of the "sacred," which, as Durkheim suggested, is at base also an aspect of human social relations (although often thought peculiar to religion). Social relations submit us, Durkheim notes, to "inconvenience, privation, and sacrifice, without which social life would be impossible" (1976 [1912] :207). It is these requirements, he says, that are "sacred," because vital, and hence isolated and protected by interdictions. In my view, religion posits these requirements also in relations between men and the world generally: without them not only human society, but the world society, would be impossible. If the relation between man and nature is social, it is also sacred. Testing it is prohibited for the same reason that testing relations among humans is prohibited: that to test a social relation is to assault it. It is not necessary to agree with some of Durkheim's followers that human relations are the only real topic of religious thought or that sacredness is unique to religion to agree that human relations provide principal elements of religious models.
The present approach further suggests that the long Western association of religion with the "supernatural" really is an aspect of the Western opposition of man to nature. In this opposition (often linked to "free will"), man is above nature, not part of it. What is "supernatural" in religion similarly is what is above nature. Gods, like men, are unpredictable and are irreducible to natural law because they are above, not subject to, that law. When religion is seen as a concern with the supernatural, it is because it applies models of humans that are supernatural.
Finally, my approach suggests why the "ultimate conditions" (Tillich, Bellah) of human existence are more typically thought the domain of religion than of science or even of philosophy. My argument already will be familiar. Any "ultimate" condition of human existence consists of some relation between humans and the sum of existing things and events. But humans know things and events through human models. These filter things and, events and, for reasons discussed, most readily admit those that fit the human template. They thus anthropomorphize the world. This is to a degree inevitable, since we are, justifiably, more concerned with humans than with nonhumans and since our "standards of formal correspondence" for them are tolerant. When the nonhuman things and events are relatively simple and close to hand-mailboxes and saplings, wind sounds and household pets-our conceptions of them are relatively easily compared with alternate conceptions. Anthropomorphism may, if necessary, relatively easily be weeded out. When the things and events in question are "ultimate conditions," the weeding becomes Herculean. To the degree that it is not done, our world is Nietzsche's above-cited "infinitely broken echo of an original sound, that of man ... the manifold copy of an original picture, that of man."
I have tried to show that this echo and this copy constitute the "illusion [with] causes of an equal generality" that Durkheim, in rejecting Tylor's intellectualism, held would be necessary "to explain a fact as general as [religion] by an illusion." My own suggestion, while intellectualistic, is also both commonsensical and rather different from Tylor's. It is simply that, just as anthropomorphism reasonably although mistakenly pervades our conceptions of those conditions that are proximate, so it pervades our conceptions of those that are ultimate. To the extent that it pervades them systematically, they, and our resulting actions, are "religious." Guthrie defines religion as cognitive and relies heavily on Popper. This is reasonable, since Guthrie takes religious doctrines to be false, and it is Popper alone who dares view most known scientific theories as false too. Yet, viewing scientific theory as explanatory, Popper can assign cognitive value even to refuted scientific theories. Guthrie says religion is explanatory, yet he uses the term much less rigorously than Popper. This is not to deny that religious doctrine is cognitive, especially since, as Gellner has argued, positivistic and functionalist attempts to empty religious utterances of their cognitive elements have failed so miserably. Guthrie relies on Gellner, yet he attempts (unsuccessfully) to empty magical utterances of their cognitive value. (Gellner finds meaning in the purest mumbo jumbo.) He seems to be attempting to exclude the lowest level of cognitive value so as to raise the stakes when bidding it for religion. The 17th-century view of religion as doctrine concerning the divine plus ritual was designed to incorporate into the body of religion natural religion, with natural theology, and the ritual of scientific research (consider Robert Boyle's Seraphick Love). This view ignores the social ingredients rather intentionally. In the same tradition, we may take science as a Weltanschauung, including Einstein's cosmic religion, to be a distillation of the cognitive function of traditional religion as expressed in Russell's (1917 Russell's ( [1903 ) "The Free Man's Worship"-but this is a very partial view of religion (for more details see Agassi 1975 Agassi , 1977 .
I have refrained from discussing Guthrie's view on anthropomorphism, as it seems to me to be rather inessential to his thesis (see Agassi 1973) .
by KARIN However, the substantive definition of religion promised at. the beginning of the article is still lacking at the end. Instead, we are presented with a definition of certain aspects of religion. According to the high standards which Guthrie brings to his discussion of existing definitions-pointing out, for example, that Geertz "fails to distinguish religious models from other models"-we expect both necessary and sufficient characteristics of religion to be delineated. A satisfying definition could either unambiguously demarcate religion from related phenomena or else deny religion the status of a separate phenomenon. In the work of Levi-Strauss (1962) we encounter an example of the latter when he reduces totemism to classificatory systems. Rappaport's (1971) functional definition of Tsembaga ritual presents a model of the former; any ritual sends information, but the religious ritual provides dependable information by invoking sanctity 4nd its quality of unquestionable truthfulness. Guthrie drifts between these two options of greater analytic utility. He is not prepared to dissolve religion, which he considers "a special case of a general phenomenon," the substantive definition of which he attempts. Yet, he merely hints at the vague distinction that the anthropomorphic models employed by religion are more "systematic, generalized, and integrated" than are nonreligious ones, from which they also differ "in content." by DAVID BUCHDAHL Department of Anthropology, Brown University, Providence, R.I. 02912, U.S.A. 17 x 79 What Guthrie gives us here is a cogent, if fairly self-evident, intellectualist explanation for why anthropomorphism is so often an essential aspect of whatever we call religion. This is news to practically no one, though it is good to be reminded occasionally about obvious facts. Still, facts do not a theory make, nor does Guthrie seem to realize that this kind of search for a definitive theory of religion is simply another variety of scientism-a deeply held faith in the activities of science (viz., theory building) that, failing to examine its own premises, bears no fruit. Certainly a "theory of religion" would have to consider the fact of anthropomorphism, but unless both categories-religion and anthropomorphism-are viewed more critically, all we can do is repeat ourselves, as Guthrie's exhaustive documentation demonstrates.
It is time to ask, as Schneider (1972) asked some years ago about kinship, what religion is all about; and we must see religion as our category, plainly and simply. Guthrie is right in citing Nietzsche on Wahrheit, but he stops short of seeing its imperative: the categories science and religion must also be viewed as metaphors and metonyms-metaphors that have hardened until they appear to us as "canonical and binding," as if we could not have a world without them. "Anthropomorphism" is a term that mediates these categories for a community of discourse whose focus is not always entirely The most important contribution of Guthrie's theory of religion is probably its bold attempt to include religious behavior with all other human behavior, including the scientific. The common denominator is language, necessarily based on analogies and metaphors whose final aims are to explain and to control the world. Therefore, religion and science are seen to shade imperceptibly into one another-they are of the same substance, although differing in some emphases. They depend on the same tool-metaphorical language-and they share the motivation of explaining and controlling the world.
This unitary theory contrasts sharply with the tendency in scholars such as Frazer, who studied superstition in order to overcome it. This tendency is not extinct, but has only grown more subtle; between the lines of contemporary scholarship there is often a condescension on the part of "modern" scholars towards the traditional cultures they are studying. Guthrie insists that all language is metaphorical, reminding anthropologists and all scholars of religion of their common humanity with their object of study and with their scientific (natural science?) colleagues. This is in itself a valuable corrective. However, the burden on such a unitary theory is heavy, and the argument for the proximity of religion and science may be somewhat overstated here. If Guthrie is to carry this argument forward, he may want to reconsider some aspects. Although one cannot disagree with the commonality to science and religion (indeed, to all life) of language and metaphor, is this the defining characteristic of each activity? In terms of his own argument, this does not seem possible, since language is common to all life and therefore not specifically characteristic of any one area of it (such as religion or science). In my own estimation, religion is, whatever else, inevitably culturespecific; science, although metaphorical, is universal in its claims. (Even Guthrie's article is "scientific" in its claim to be a systematic treatment of religion in all times and places.) In this regard, Guthrie's theory might be stronger if it compared theology (and Buddhology, etc.)-the more theoretical aspect of religion-with science, the theoretical aspect of knowledge. Similarly, religion and technology seem to be the pragmatic counterparts for more fruitful comparison.
The heart of Guthrie's theory of religion-anthropomorphism -is. an old theory, and Guthrie has used his wide reading in philosophy and language to refine it. However, he does not really pin down the "human-like," but only returns to the tautology that language is human, concluding that anthropomorphism is "inevitable." Since this is known by definition (all human behavior is based on language and model-use), the question is simply pushed back one more step: what is the human-like? Phrased in the simplest philosophical terms, this is the age-old question of what it means to be human. I am surprised that Guithrie does not at least refer to the common anthropological answer that to be human means to be a part of a culture (although he does preface an anecdote about an advertisement with the statement that " 'Culture' itself may in a sense be anthropomorphized").
I think that a crucial aspect of anthropomorphism that Guthrie has underestimated is projection. All the Greek theories of religion were based on the rationalistic premise that religion is something other than it appears or claims to bethat it is actually a projection of human perceptions (fantasies, fears, wishes, etc.). But if it is something else, then what is it? Guthrie's answer of "the human-like" is inadequate, because by definition all language (including religion) is human-like. (The theory would be strengthened if it could develop a contrast with that in culture which is not human-like.) To say that being religious is equal to being human (projecting the humanlike on the nonhuman) simply raises the question of what the human is. Here Guthrie has attempted to resolve the question by pointing to the idea of projection, siding with Greek rationalism filtered through Freud and modern language studies. But if he is to maintain his theory, then he must be much more specific about the nature of projection and not refer tautologically to language. The two basic questions here are (1) What is being projected? and (2) How is it projected (from the human mind into culture?)? Jung has not found favor in anthropological circles, but at least his projectionist theory of archetypes (a set of analogies, to be sure) accounted for a universal psychological basis for culturally divergent forms of religion. I am not favoring Jung over Freud here, however, but suggesting that all projectionist theories reduce the diversity of human culture to a too simply psychological mechanism. This is a point that Guthrie might consider more thoroughly. In this regard he comes close to falling under his own criticism of seeing religion as a form of (projectionist) aberration.
There are a number of minor points of agreement and disagreement that might be mentioned, but one further suggestion will suffice. In his eagerness to emphasize the unity of religion and science, Guthrie runs roughshod over the term "ambiguous," assuming that both religion and science want to banish ambiguity by superimposing (projecting) a model that explains and controls. But just as ambiguity is, as Leonard Bernstein has suggested, a clue to our appreciation of music, so is it a key aspect of religion. In addition to control and explanation, religion thrives on mystery, openness, spontaneity, surprise. Sharing Guthrie's interest in Japanese religion, I would remind him that a Japanese festival is fun.
Guthrie deserves our thanks for continuing the attempt to find a more widely accepted definition of religion.
by MOSHE GREENBERG Department of Bible, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel. 30 ix 79 The most remarkable thing in Guthrie's erudite paper is its leap from analysis of the language of religion to evaluation of the truth of religion's alleged cognitions. Contemplative thinkers among Jews, Christians, and Moslems have always recognized the predominance of anthropomorphism as the mode of religious perception and discourse and have declared it an obstacle to true knowledge of God. When Guthrie writes that "anthropomorphism ... is . . . by definition, mistaken," he echoes much more vehement denunciations of it by ancient and medieval theologians, whose sophisticated analysis of religious language was stimulated by the raillery of opponents who (not altogether unlike Guthrie) argued that since the language of revelation was puerile the God of revelation could not be taken seriously. Guthrie has shown forcefully and well why anthropomorphism is the universal language of discourse about nonhuman phenomena, including, eminently, the religious. He goes on, however, to say: "The characteristic religious assertion is, I think, false: the nonhuman world is, in fact, not a person or persons and does not interact linguistically or ethically with people"; or again, less "overweeningly," "the nonhuman universe . . . I think, really neither listens nor replies." Many have thought, through the ages, that the nonhuman world neither listens nor replies (a caustic Yiddish translation of a Jewish litany entitled 'imru lelohim "Say to/of God" is ret zu di vant "Speak to the wall"); on the other hand, many others have thought that (at least an aspect of) it did. How is Guthrie's (or the "many" 's) thinking on this subject more valid than the speculations of, say, medieval theologians? If God existed and communicated with mankind at large (as the multiplicity of religions might suggest) and not only with theologians and anthropologists, such communication-as Guthrie has demonstrated more geometrico-would perforce be anthropomorphic. But be it ever so sophisticated, no analysis of the language of man suffices to pronounce on the reality of its referents. It may be that, as some religious texts have it, the organizing aspect of the universe is in some way affinite to humanness (man as "the image of God") and that anthropomorphism is therefore a key to some sort of true perception of reality. Or, as "many" (Guthrie among them) "think" (=doubt), it may not be so. A radio receiver scanning space may be so constructed that it can only emit sounds. This is not enough to prove that out there sound as we know it is to be found, but neither is the nature of the instrument a ground for asserting that nothing out there corresponds in any way to the sounds emitted. Guthrie appears to hold to a kind of metaphysical solipsism; its artless insinuation into his scientific paper strikes me as curious. But then if the anthropomorphism of religion did correspond somehow to an aspect of nonhuman reality, Guthrie's sweeping reduction of religion to a special case of anthropomorphism (by definition mistaken) would of course lose cogency.
by IAN JARVIE 726 Idaho Ave., Santa Monica, Calif. 90403, U.S.A. 25 x 79 Much of Guthrie's argument I find plausible and pleasing, even when he chides Agassi and me for calling magic "anthropomorphic" when clearly we should have said "animistic." I want to offer not so much criticisms as extensions of his line of thought that all those who would classify themselves as "neointellectualist" thinkers might consider. We give a purchase to our critics, whether they be functionalist, symbolist, materialist, or religious-apologist, by our adoption of their basic assumption: that there are, as it were, in nature three or more distinct categories labelled by us "magic," "religion," and "science." Religion particularly is singled out as something special; intellectualists want, I believe, to assimilate it to other things.
Intellectualism with regard to science is not uncontroversial, but our ancestors Tylor, Frazer, and Mannheim would not deny it. The intellectualist account of magic that assimilates it to the history of science is disputed. Intellectualism towards religion, however, brings forth the stiffest resistance. A special air hangs about religion: some people cannot bear to see it assimilated to the other two. Things like prayer, mystery, sacredness, ritual, system, deep philosophical reflection are held to mark it off from magic and science. So, if religion is an error, it is not on a par with superstition or simple mistake; it has to signify something beyond itself, some sort of human universal.
Intellectualists can try, as for example Agassi and I (Agassi 1977, Jarvie 1976, Agassi and Jarvie 1973, Jarvie and Agassi 1967) have tried, to show how symbolism, ritual, system, mystery, and so on, are all to be found in the so-called scientific tradition. One can try to show that thinking of religion as an error is not an adverse judgement on its participants (Horton 1968) . One can also try to show that religions make a lot of sense when they are assimilated to the cognitive enterprise (Jarvie 1964 , Lawrence 1964 , Horton 1967 , 1973a ). Yet despite these arguments the current of anti-intellectualism flows strong.
Perhaps this is because we are overlooking the most fundamental issue, which is that the intellectualist asserts that there is a strong continuity or connection between magic, religion, and science: that they are not naturally differentiated social institutions, but convenient categorizations and distinctions for and under the control of certain theoretical purposes. Intellectualism is that theoretical purpose which holds it to be unsatisfactory to distinguish between man's cognitive endeavours on any other grounds than their truth or falsity, or their capability of being true or false, or their practical efficacy when applied to the world.
Whether substances and medicines are used, whether pervasive social forces are invoked, whether angels and gods are involved in the content of the cognition is for intellectualist purposes irrelevant. The assertion of continuity is made in order to assess our cognitive efforts: penicillin is more effective than prayer; germs are a better explanation of disease than divine punishment (Agassi 1968a ). Any assessment leaves some people disgruntled. We are unlikely to hear from the witch doctor, but we certainly hear from all those who have a soft spot for religion. After all, were they to accept intellectualism their own religious practice or that of their family and friends would be rendered superstitious. Religion and magic can rarely be shown directly to be in error, but once they are assimilated into the history of pre-science they tend to get discredited.
Intellectualists need not and for simplicity's sake should not deny that religious institutions, beliefs, and practices can for certain purposes be looked on as distinct. They also need not deny that all communication-the very possibility of social life itself-turns on the use of symbols to make sense of the world. These are not concessions. That anti-intellectualists flourish them triumphantly shows how highly charged their reaction to cognitive assessment is.
The strongest argument in the anti-intellectualist's hands is Durkheim's view that in order to explain a phenomenon as general as religion as an illusion it would be necessary that the illusion have causes of an equal generality. I'm not sure that Guthrie's anthropomorphism does the trick. A simpler reply would be to suggest that Durkheim's positivism has resulted in his getting it all wrong. The natural condition of mankind is error and illusion, and this error and illusion is socially embedded and sustained. The real problem is to explain how on earth man ever managed to free himself from his benighted condition-how cognitive vested interests were dislodged to allow a little progress in cognition.
Popper has given an individualistic account of this in two works (1945, 1958) by BENSON SALER Department of Anthropology, Brandeis University, Waltham, Mass. 02154, U.S.A. 24 x 79 That men may be disposed to "anthropomorphize the world" seems decidedly plausible, for the reasons cogently set forth by Guthrie. To say, however, that "religion may be defined as systematic application of human-like models to nonhunman, in addition to human, phenomena" and that it "can be identified ... as systematic use ... of anthropomorphic models for nonhuman things and events in addition to human ones" strikes me as an unfortunate choice of emphasis. The excerpts quoted recognize that nonhuman phenomena remain nonhuman, however anthropomorphized they may be. The thrust of Guthrie's essay, however, is to focus our attention on the "human-like" aspects or qualities of nonhuman "events" and "things," while effectively relegating the vital and often dramatic nonhuman character of such phenomena to a subsidiary position.
The really fascinating thing about "religion," as I view it, is its partial break with anthropomorphism-or, if you like, its postulated transcendence of anthropomorphism. While religions do indeed demonstrate more or less systematic applications of anthropomorphic models, they also typically envision crucial departures from such models. A reasonable perspective on this issue has been stated by Ehnmark (1935 : 1) with regard to Homer's description of the gods: To a modern reader the most striking characteristic of the Homeric gods is their humanity; but this cannot possibly have been their chief attribute. What constitutes their divinity is not their likeness to man but the quality that distinguishes them from him. From our point of view the most important criterion for the distinction between gods and men is the fact that the gods only existed in the belief of their worshippers. Such a view, however, necessarily implies that one has ceased to believe in the gods in question; for a living religious faith the gods are just as real as anything else. If they are conceived anthropomorphically they must consequently possess some other quality which renders them divine and distinct from man. It thus follows that if Homer's description of the gods embodied a living religious faith, if it was genuinely felt to represent reality, the gods cannot have been regarded as wholly human and their human attributes must have been of secondary importance. If on the other hand the gods are human throughout it is definitely improbable that they were the objects of faith.
Guthrie states that "theologians, philosophers of religion, and comparative religionists widely recognize the anthropomorphism of religion" and that they "often see it as a difficulty for theology." He cites several examples, but he does not pursue the point. I think that it would prove productive to pursue it, at least with regard to Western religions. Many Western theologians have regarded anthropomorphism not only as "a difficulty for theology," but also as a stumbling block for the development of an authentic religious consciousness. Others within the Western religious camp (biblical exegetes, for example, and "religious virtuosi" as typified by mystics) have often shared that view.
There is a strong strain in Western religions that emphasizes the "otherness" of deity vis-a-vis man. For some religiously oriented Westerners, indeed, authentic religion is to be identified by the intellectual and affective transcendence of anthropomorphic models. Hodges (1956:229) expresses that viewpoint when he declares that the truly religious conception of God "is the conception of something essentially mysterious and incommensurable with all objects of our experience....
Yet it is just this mysterious character which makes God really God, which gives the specifically religious quality to the concept of Him." Now, not all Westerners who deem themselves religious equally advocate or achieve breaks with anthropomorphic models. Some would seem to come closer to doing so than others. This might very well be the case in non-Western societies also, and it would be interesting to explore the possibility, perhaps along lines suggested by Radin (1937 Radin ( , 1960 Radin ( [1953 ).
In summary, I contend that what may be most interesting about religion is the break with (but not the total rejection of) anthropomorphic models. I do not think that it suffices to define religion in the way that Guthrie does, nor am I inclined to suppose that anthropomorphism "constitutes the fundamental explanation of religious belief." While I accept Guthrie's arguments about man's proclivity to anthropomorphize, and while I acknowledge that various apparent expressions of anthropomorphization can be found among many (and perhaps all) religions, I think that what really needs further exploration and explanation is, in a manner of speaking, the incompleteness of anthropomorphism.
If space permitted I would comment extensively on Guthrie's treatment of the "supernatural." I think that he makes an interesting point with regard to some Western usages of supernatural. The problem is complex, however, because in the intellectual history of the West "nature" has meant many different things, the relation of man to nature has been variously conceived, and the term supernatural has been assigned a variety of senses-ranging from one so technical that God himself, strictly speaking, is not called supernatural except by a sort of appreciative extension of the technical term (Baltazar 1966 Like so many anthropologists before him, Guthrie has assumed that the only way to proceed is to choose between intellectual and emotional approaches to the question of religion. In the tradition of Frazer and Tylor and, more recently, Horton, he has chosen the former, and thus he leaves himself open to the same critique which anthropologists have levelled against this position for over half a century. While the attempt to treat religion as rational human behavior and to look on science and religion as part of the same system of thought is commendable, for a general theory of religion one must also take into account the "mystery" element so prominent in many, if not all, religions. Revelation and faith cannot very easily fit into a purely intellectual or cognitive explanation. Besides, stressing the similarities between religion and science as models for understanding ambiguous phenomena might be desirable, but it has the disadvantage of neglecting or minimizing the obvious differences that exist between them. Surely, the conflict between religion and science has not been founded on shallow grounds. Genuine progress in anthropological theory of religion will be slow or nonexistent unless both the cognitive and the experiential aspects of the human person are given equal importance.
Again, Guthrie is faced with the choice of an emic or an etic interpretation of religion. His analysis shows clearly that he prefers the latter. In so doing he ignores one major element in religious thought and practice, namely, that for the believer religion is not just a way of knowing, understanding, and interpreting the world around us, but also, and especially, an affirmation of another kind of reality. In other words, the believer asserts that what he or she believes in actually exists. This is quite different from saying that religious beliefs are some kind of rational model for interpreting ambiguous phenomena. One might add that religious statements may have solved several of these puzzles, but only at the expense of creating new paradoxes.
The tendency among anthropologists has been to assume, tacitly at least, that religious beliefs and practices, while performing useful and maybe necessary intellectual, emotional, and sociological functions, are basically illusions. Guthrie has joined the crowd. He states without much ado that "the characteristic religious assertion is, I think, false." But isn't this a rather casual dismissal of a thorny problem, and won't it influence how he thinks about religion and what conclusions he draws about its nature? Guthrie has paid great attention to several epistemological issues of cognition. He has, however, avoided discussion of one major problem: Can we arrive at a satisfactory definition and understanding of religion without examining, and to some degree answering, the question of the truth or falsehood of religious statements? If the answer is no, then we must logically question anthropological endeavors which claim to supply us with a kind of "ultimate" answer to what religion is rather than limiting themselves to the place of religion in social life and the cognitive and emotional functions it performs.
The above comments are meant not to detract from Guthrie's contribution, but to draw attention to several philosophical assumptions which cannot be simply taken for granted. The merit of emotional or intellectual theories of religion lies in their capacity to generate research rather than in their answers to the question of what religion is. Guthrie's theory will no doubt stimulate research even though it fails to supply a satisfactory answer to the fundamental question of why people believe.
by KEVIN It is important to spell out fully the criteria for the choice between competing models, both between different religious comprehensions and between, say, religious and atheistic or religious and scientific models. What is the basis for Guthrie's criteria? The first criterion he suggests is that a model should somehow correspond to the phenomena in question. Assuming he means there to be some "picturing" of reality itself, wherein lies this objectiveness? Is it that, when religious models conflict in what they say about reality, what are conflicting are the "noncorrespondence" parts of the models? How are we as moderns to choose between competing religious systems (assuming we wish to select more of the "correspondence" parts)? When Guthrie asks, "Why do they [religion and magic] so reluctantly give up this ambition [to see nonhuman reality at the human level of organization], despite evidence that they cannot attain it?", what is his justification, and does he mean that reality in no way corresponds to human-type models? The universality and persistence of anthropomorphic model making might imply that there is some factual truth in this approach. Furthermore, could reality, beyond being perceived in an ambiguous way, be at root ambiguous in itself? "The characteristic religious assertion is, I think, false: the nonhuman world is, in fact, not a person or persons and does not interact linguistically or ethically with people." For some ungiven reasons Guthrie dismisses the religious anthropomorphic type of model as having any truth value. (His reasons would help in understanding his criteria.) Christian theologians often insist that God is utterly different from any sort of world -that the function of the word "God" is to relativize everything and anything (Kaufman 1972 (Kaufman , 1975 Sharpe 1979 ). Guthrie's view of what is characteristic of religious assertions may not be correct. Furthermore, granted that it is the nonhuman world which is the reference for religious models, some would suggest it to be "human-like" rather than to be "a person or persons." Guthrie is probably trying to suggest the former, but this distinction is important. Not all religions and theologies suggest that reality is a, or many, superhuman persons; rather, for some religions, human-type categories are the most useful in attempting to understand reality.
by GEORGES TIsSOT Department of Religious Studies, Faculty of Arts, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ont., Canada KIN 6N5. 16 x 79 Guthrie's proposal is a good occasion for reflection on knowing and on religion as a form of understanding. I offer three comments, interrelated and inconclusive: therefore have a basis in reality. This claim seems vague. The universe may be human-like in some significant way (it surely is human-like in insignificant ways), but there is no good evidence that it is. The fact that many people think that it is is not good evidence, since they spontaneously but mistakenly think many things to be human-like. To adopt Greenberg's radio analogy, it is as if a radio which had been emitting sounds of static when oriented to an earth station continued to emit static when oriented to outer space. The uniformity of its behavior despite a change in orientation does not prove that nothing in space corresponds to static, but it does suggest that the static has more to do with the internal state of the radio or with meaningless interference than with signals from a coherent source. Similarly, the uniform pervasiveness of anthropomorphism in mundane human cognition-Chiquita Banana and Mickey Mouse among myriad others-suggests that the same principles are at work in perception of the world (either as a whole, or of its guiding principle) as God. If anthropomorphism (by definition-I must insist-mistaken, which is what distinguishes it from perception of the real continuities and similarities of human and nonhuman nature) occurs throughout perception and cognition of the immediate, tangible world, there is no reason to think that it suddenly ceases in perception of the less tangible aspects of the world. That is the significance of my claim (and that of Barnes [1973] , among others) that the processes of human thought are uniform from one domain to another.
Agassi limits debate at the outset by declaring that it is impossible to define religion (among a number of other terms in common use), so I shall limit myself to a brief comment on this view and on two apparent misreadings, one minor and one major, of my article. First, he seems to confuse nominal and real definitions when he says that it is impossible to define religion and other words because "each has diverse ingredients and functions" which vary with circumstance. I strongly agree that the reality which we try to comprehend, by carving it up and labelling and forming models of the pieces, is in fact diverse and continuous. The continuity and similarity of religion with other belief and behavior is one of my major, explicit themes. I therefore have not proposed that reality be divided into boxes, but only suggested how a given word may best be used, and why. If discourse (perhaps especially anthropological discourse, because it aims to be cross-cultural) is to be possible, we need to share understandings about what terms shall represent what bands on the spectrum. Such preliminary understandings, not an absolute partitioning of reality, are the first aim of definition. In addition, for theoretical purposes some definitions are better than others because their referents appear (in the light of theory) to have more internal coherence (the referent of "dog," for example, or "cat") as natural complexes. Terms are defined best when they are made to refer to such relatively coherent (for some purpose) phenomena.
Agassi also says in passing that I attempt (unsuccessfully) to empty magic of its cognitive value. This reading bemuses me, since what I said is that magic assumes an "animal level of organization in phenomena that (in the etic view) do not possess" it. That is, it is animistic. To say that a view conflicts with some other view is of course not to deny it cognitive value, as Agassi doubtless knows. I can only claim innocence of any intent to strip magic of meaning.
Last, Agassi thinks that anthropomorphism is "rather inessential" to my thesis, but since he does not say why except to refer to a work of his to which I do not at the moment have access, I cannot answer what seems a major disagreement.
I agree with Saliba that the conflict between science and religion has good grounds and do not mean to minimize their differences either in content or in method; I feel, however, that these have already been sufficiently noted by others. Saliba also makes a widely followed but, to me, untenable distinction between the aspects of religion as "just a way of knowing . .. the world around us" and as an "affirmation of another kind of reality" and says that any theory of religion must account for the difference. The difference Saliba sees here may perhaps be significant, but it seems to me (and to Horton [1967] ) the same as that between our ordinary view of tables and chairs and the "other kind" of reality of molecules and atoms which the physicist says underlies them. Finally, Saliba says that I too casually dismiss, or even avoid, the thorny problem of religious truth. The problem is thorny and of course deserves discussion at great length. Several factors prevented this here. One of them is simply the length limitation of articles; this one may be too long already. A more troublesome factor is that the assertions that have been made by religions are extremely heterogeneous. Many of them doubtless are true and many doubtless not true. Any overall assessment of their assertions in general, or even of those of a single religious tradition, is far beyond my capacity. My intended evaluation here has been rash enough, though only an evaluation of what seems to be the assertion that distinguishes religion from philosophical, scientific, and other categories of thought, namely, that some important part of the nonhuman world is, like humans, so organized as to be capable of symbolism. I neither dismiss nor avoid evaluation of this assertion, since my entire argument tries to show that it is one aspect of comprehensive anthropomorphism, plausible but mistaken, in human cognition.
Tissot begins with a lucid, accurate, and even-handed summary of my argument. He then poses some classic questions about the relation of human understanding to that which it understands. Does "understanding" not require some isomorphism between the mind and its object? If the human mind is rational, does isomorphism not imply that the object of its thought is rational too? If science assumes that the universe is intelligible to humans, does science not assimilate nonhuman reality to itself, anthropomorphistically and thus "religiously"?
These problems disappear if we can agree (with Piaget [1970] and others) that to "understand" something means to form an acceptable model of it. The isomorphism, then, is between a particular phenomenon and a particular model rather than between reality and the mind as wholes. The model, as a product of mind, is part of it but not equivalent to it. Further, "rationality" in mind, as I understand it, is not so much a particular structure as a capacity-a capacity to apportion means (in this case, particular metaphors) to ends (in this case, a model of some phenomenon). The rationality of the model maker, then, has nothing to do with that of the phenomenon modelled, and people can understand whirlwinds and plagues while having very little in common with them. The answer to Tissot is that understanding does require isomorphism between model and phenomenon, but not between mind and reality as wholes.
Saler, like Greenberg, thinks that the attitudes of theologians toward anthropomorphism need more attention, and he thinks also that the fact that religious conceptions are not fully anthropomorphic-i.e., that gods are distinguishable from men -needs special attention. I agree that the extensive attempts of theologians to resolve what most though not all of them see as the problem of anthropomorphism do deserve more consideration, and I hope to examine them at another time.
The facts that religious anthropomorphism does not make gods into exact copies of men, however, and that some religious themes emphasize the "otherness" of deity when compared to man do not seem at all surprising. The objects of religious thought often are other than man: plants and animals, rain and drought, moon and stars, in short, the phenomena of the universe at large. Direct observation of these and calculation of any more general principles that may underlie them must suggest that none of them, singly or together, are exactly the same thing as humans. Pray as one may, the gods responsible for rain do not reply in an audible voice as humans do, nor can they be imprisoned or otherwise held to account. In actual
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CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY Guthrie: A COGNITIVE THEORY OF RELIGION fact there is nothing exactly like humans but humans. When we use humaii-like principles to account for nonhuman things, some adjustments must be made, just as when the analogy of water waves is invoked for electromagnetic radiation. That human-like models are modified when invoked for nonhuman things is similarly explained by the discrepancies that immediately arise if they are applied directly. One does not say that God is a human any more than one says that light is water despite its apparent partial sharing of wave phenomena, and for the same reason. Analogy asserts partial equations between phenomena, not exact ones. What is surprising is rather that the human analogy has been stretched as far and as persistently as it has.
I am grateful for Sharpe's endorsement and agree that my position needs a longer presentation, particularly regarding the roles and natures of models and metaphors and the criteria for choosing between competing models. These topics have only been sketched here. In addition, Sharpe asks several questions that may be answered briefly. He mentions my claim that religion cannot achieve its ambition of interpreting reality at the human level of organization and asks for my justification. This is a difficult question, since my claim reflects my total assessment of the truth of the central religious assertion. Like other general paradigmatic assertions, religious ones can, to draw on Jarvie once more, "rarely be shown directly to be in error"; but they can be gradually discredited by more persuasive ones. Once these latter arise, the enterprises of their predecessors appear hopeless, as, for example, the enterprise of geocentric astronomy appeared hopeless after its succession by heliocentric astronomy. It appears that the religious enterprise is inexorably yielding to a variety of others, usually lumped as "scientific." My justification for my claim that religion cannot achieve its cognitive ambition is that I believe, partly for the reasons given as propositions and deductions, that its fundamental premise is mistaken. Related evidence may be found in the fact that nonanthropomorphic, secular explanations of natural phenomena, for example, are continuing to supplant anthropomorphic religious ones. Contemporary meteorological models give better accounts of rainfall and drought than do models of a benevolent or punitive deitv, and Darwin and Lyell give a better account of human and world origins than does Genesis.
The answer to Sharpe's second question, raised also by Greenberg and Tissot-whether I mean that realitv in no way corresponds to "human-type" models-is no. There are many homologies and analogies between us and the rest of the world. However, in the crucial way-its evident lack of ability to communicate symbolically, owed evidently to its lack of the necessary organization-reality at large does not correspond to human-like models.
Earhart's questions center on this identification of language and symbolism as most characteristically human, which he finds a tautology "since this is known by definition" and "since language is common to all life." He also says that this emphasis on language use will not help identify religion, since language is also used by science and other systems. There seem to be several confusions here. First, although there is some consensus among anthropologists both that "language" is somehow qualitatively different from other kinds of communication and that it is more or less peculiar to humans, this has not arisen by definition alone, but by research. Second, it follows that it is not true that language is common, as Earhart twice says, to "all life." He may have meant to say "to all human life." Last, I did not say that the use of language characterizes religion (or that "being religious is equal to being human"), but rather that (systematic) use of language (and other symbolism) to deal with the nonhuman world characterizes it. Physicists, as physicists, talk to other people, but they do not seriously talk to atoms; priests do address the heavens and make sacrifices to cure plagues, and religious farmers pray for rain.
I especially welcome Jarvie's support and extension of my position because he has written extensively on the same subject from an allied point of view and because much of his commentary clarifies my argument, often by paraphrasing it. I am both encouraged and enlightened by his remarks. I find myself at odds with him in only a few places. He alludes to my epigraph from Durkheim and agrees that it is the strongest antiintellectual argument but, without a word of explanation, doubts that anthropomorphism is the necessary illusion. He suggests that a better solution is to say that Durkheim is wrong and that the "natural condition of mankind is error and illusion." However, this solution does not suggest (as mine does) why error and illusion should take a religious form, which after all has been the chief competitor of science, Jarvie's main interest. Moreover, if the statement is taken at face value, it is hard to see how mankind could ever have coped with the world. It seems more accurate to say that the natural condition of mankind is incomplete understanding, or partial error.
Later, in the midst of (seemingly pre-Kuhnian) assertions that science, unlike all prescientific cognitive efforts, is immune to distortion by society and tradition, Jarvie suddenly says that "Guthrie, then, does not go far enough." Far enough with what? He does not say plainly, but evidently I should have addressed myself to Popper and Gellner on the scientific breakthrough rather than to a theory of religion.
